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THE PROPER MEANING OF “PROPER”:  
WHY THE REGULATION OF INTRASTATE,  
NON-COMMERCIAL SPECIES UNDER THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT IS AN INVALID 
EXERCISE OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE  
INTRODUCTION 
California has a new endangered species on its hands in the San 
Joaquin Valley—farmers. Thanks to environmental regulations 
designed to protect the likes of the three-inch long delta smelt, one 
of America‘s premier agricultural regions is suffering in a drought 
made worse by federal regulations. . . . [T]ens of billions of gallons 
of water from mountains east and north of Sacramento have been 
channelled away from farmers and into the ocean, leaving hundreds 
of thousands of acres of arable land fallow or scorched. . . . The 
result has already been devastating for the state‘s farm economy. In 
the inland areas affected by the court-ordered water restrictions, the 
jobless rate has hit 14.3%, with some farming towns like Mendota 
seeing unemployment numbers near 40%. Statewide, the rate 
reached 11.6% in July, higher than it has been in 30 years.
1
 
In 1973, Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act
2
 (―ESA‖ or the 
―Act‖) in response to a growing awareness of the interconnected nature of 
the ecosystem and the need to maintain species diversity.
3
 The ESA arms 
its administering agencies
4
 with ample weaponry to achieve that end.
5
 The 
―take‖ provision in section 1538 of the Act prohibits the fishing, hunting, 
or harming of any species listed on the Act‘s endangered species list.6 To 
 
 
 1. California’s Man-Made Drought, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2009, 12:49 PM), http://online 
.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204731804574384731898375624.html.  
 2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
 3. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006) (―The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means 
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be 
conserved [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened 
species . . . .‖). 
 4. The ESA tasks the Department of the Interior and the Department of Commerce with 
enforcing its provisions. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (2006). 
 5. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (describing the ESA as ―the 
most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any 
nation‖). 
 6. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006). To ―take‖ is defined in full as ―to harass, harm, pursue, 
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.‖ 16 
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ensure enforcement of the take provision, the ESA authorizes the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service
7
 (―FWS‖) to designate a ―critical habitat‖ 
for each endangered species.
8
 Section 1536 gives regulatory bite to this 
authority by allowing the FWS to issue biological opinions dictating how 
federal agencies and affected private parties should act to preserve these 
critical habitats.
9
 Developers, farmers, and other adversely impacted 
private parties have frequently clashed with the FWS and various 
environmental groups over the limits of this authority.
10
 The delta smelt in 
California is just one among many instances where various competing 
interests have tussled over how best to balance short-term economic, 
agricultural, and development concerns with long-term environmental 
vitality. 
But below the surface of these difficult policy issues lies an equally 
tangled and critical issue of constitutional law. Congress enacted the ESA 
under the authority of the Article I Interstate Commerce Clause.
11
 Because 
the ESA primarily regulates species and activities that flow through 
interstate commerce, Congress‘s reliance on the Commerce Clause is 
facially sound.
12
 But many species regulated by the ESA are found only 
within the confines of one state and have no commercial value, and thus 
 
 
U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2006). The Act mandates the promulgating of the endangered species list 
established in 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c) (2006).  
 7. The FWS is one of the two agencies within the Department of the Interior charged with the 
implementation and enforcement of the ESA. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2012). The other agency is the 
National Marine Fisheries Service, and its role is beyond the scope of this Note. Id. 
 8. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(1) (―The Secretary . . . shall, concurrently with making a 
determination under paragraph (1) that a species is an endangered species or a threatened species, 
designate any habitat of such species which is then considered to be critical habitat . . . .‖). 
 9. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2006) (―[T]he Secretary shall provide to the Federal agency 
and the [private party], if any, a written statement setting forth the Secretary‘s opinion, and a summary 
of the information on which the opinion is based, detailing how the agency action affects the species or 
its critical habitat.‖). 
 10. For a full discussion of ESA cases decided by the Supreme Court, see J.B. Ruhl, The 
Endangered Species Act’s Fall from Grace in the Supreme Court, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 487 
(2012). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (―[Congress shall have the power] To regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States . . . .‖). Although the text of the ESA neither expressly invokes the 
Commerce Clause nor provides a jurisdictional hook limiting the ESA‘s application to objects related 
to interstate commerce, courts reviewing the Act‘s validity under the Commerce Clause have 
overlooked these deficiencies. See, e.g., Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (quoting United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 1999)) (―[T]he absence of 
such a jurisdictional element simply means that courts must determine independently whether the 
statute regulates activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which 
viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect[] interstate commerce.‖).  
 12. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a successful facial challenge ―must establish 
that no set of circumstances exists under which the [regulation] would be valid.‖ Reno v. Flores, 507 
U.S. 292, 301 (1993) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). 
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are not involved in ―interstate commerce‖ in the term‘s ordinary sense.13 
This apparent regulatory overreach has given rise to claims that the ESA, 
as applied to certain intrastate, non-commercial species, is an invalid 
exercise of the commerce power. But since 2000, all five federal circuits 
deciding as-applied challenges to the ESA have, under various and 
conflicting analyses, upheld the agency action.
14
 The Supreme Court has 
left the question open; although the Court has decided ESA cases on issues 
of standing and statutory construction,
15
 it has yet to grant certiorari in a 
case challenging the Act‘s constitutionality.16 
This Note argues that the ESA‘s regulation of purely intrastate, non-
commercial species is an invalid exercise of the Commerce Clause. 
Reviewing courts have reached the opposite conclusion via two doctrinal 
avenues: (1) by finding that the species in question bore ―a substantial 
relation to interstate commerce‖ in satisfaction of the Court‘s framework 
set forth in United States v. Lopez,
17
 or (2) by holding that the species was 
an ―essential part[] of a larger regulation of economic activity,‖ an 
alternate path to Commerce Clause validity employed by the Court in its 
2005 Gonzales v. Raich decision.
18
 Though these doctrines have the 
Court‘s approval, they do not flow from the commerce power alone. 
Because these approaches allow for regulation of objects or activities that 
merely affect interstate commerce, both implicitly rely on the classic 
constitutional catch-all: the Necessary and Proper Clause.
19
 This reliance 
 
 
 13. Robert P. Fowler et al., Commerce Clause Challenges to the Listings of Intrastate, Non-
Commercial Species Under the Endangered Species Act, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC‘Y PRAC. 
GROUPS, Oct. 2006, at 69, 77. 
 14. San Luis & Delta-Mondota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S.Ct. 498 (2011); Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250 (11th 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1097 (2008); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th 
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d 1062, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
1218 (2004); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001). 
 15. The Supreme Court has decided only five ESA cases: Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153 (1978); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); and Nat‘l 
Ass‘n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007). 
 16. See Fowler, supra note 13, at 69. 
 17. 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (citing NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 
(1937)).  
 18. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24–25 (2005) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (―[The Congress shall have Power] [t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.‖). The most prominent judicial recognition of this interpretation is Justice Scalia‘s concurring 
opinion in Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (―Congress‘s regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not 
themselves part of interstate commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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requires that the regulation be both necessary for the achievement of a 
legitimate congressional purpose and constitutionally proper in its means 
of attaining it.
20
 Because the ESA‘s regulation of intrastate, non-
commercial species impermissibly encroaches on areas of traditional state 
sovereignty, it is not constitutionally ―proper,‖ and is therefore 
unconstitutional. 
Although many scholars have addressed the validity of the ESA as 
applied to intrastate, non-commercial species, the discussion has largely 
taken place within the framework employed by the lower federal courts.
21
 
This Note is the first to contend that the Act is an invalid exercise of its 
true constitutional anchor: the Necessary and Proper Clause.
22
 Part I of this 
Note examines the development of the Court‘s Necessary and Proper 
doctrine, with particular focus on the ―proper‖ element. Part II explores 
the relationship between the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Court‘s 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and Part III discusses the lower court 
rulings on the ESA‘s constitutionality and explains why the ESA‘s 
regulation of intrastate, non-commercial species is not ―proper.‖ 
I. REGULATION ENACTED PURSUANT TO THE NECESSARY AND PROPER 
CLAUSE MUST BE BOTH ―NECESSARY‖ AND ―PROPER‖ 
The Supreme Court‘s modern Necessary and Proper Clause 
jurisprudence dates back to McCulloch v. Maryland,
23
 when Chief Justice 
Marshall held that the establishment of a national bank was necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution Congress‘s enumerated Article I 
powers.
24
 Though prior decisions had held that this clause only 
supplemented, and did not add to, Congress‘s powers, Marshall read the 
 
 
commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.‖). This Note argues for the adoption of this 
minority view. 
 20. See id. at 39. 
 21. See Michael C. Blumm & George A. Kimbrell, Commentary, Gonzalez v. Raich, the 
“Comprehensive Scheme” Principle, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act, 35 
ENVTL. L. 491, 494 (2005); Bradford C. Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich: Is the Endangered Species 
Act Constitutional Under the Commerce Clause?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 375, 459 (2007); Jud Mathews, 
Case Comment, Turning the Endangered Species Act Inside Out?, 113 YALE L.J. 947, 948 (2004); 
Jennifer A. Maier, Comment, Outgrowing the Commerce Clause: Finding Endangered Species a 
Home in the Constitutional Framework, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 489, 521 (2006); Fowler, supra 
note 13, at 77.  
 22. Professor Mank analyzed this issue in the context of Justice Scalia‘s Raich concurrence but 
concluded that ―the ESA places limits on national authority that are consistent with . . . Justice Scalia‘s 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . .‖ Mank, supra note 21, at 434–35. 
 23. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 24. Id. at 420. 
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Clause to allow Congressional acts that would otherwise have been plainly 
beyond the scope of Article I.
25
 Later cases relied on this concept of 
implied powers to validate far-reaching congressional regulation. In the 
Commerce Clause context, for example, the Court in United States v. 
Darby upheld a statute requiring employers to keep records of intrastate 
transactions, because good record-keeping was necessary to ensure that 
Congress‘s regulatory labor scheme was properly implemented.26 
Though Justice Marshall wrote that the terms ―necessary‖ and ―proper‖ 
were ―probably to be considered as synon[y]mous,‖27 later cases began to 
treat the two terms separately. While ―necessary‖ came to mean 
―convenient‖ or ―reasonably adapted,‖28 and not actually necessary in the 
denotative sense of the word, the Court understands ―proper‖ to invoke the 
Constitution‘s external limits on Congress‘s power.29 Thus, even if a 
regulation were necessary to effectuate Congress‘s power over interstate 
commerce, it could still be improper because it violated, say, the Tenth 
Amendment.
30
 
These external limits include federalism concerns and respect for 
traditional areas of state sovereignty such as land use,
31
 criminal law,
32
 and 
 
 
 25. See id. at 419. 
 26. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Though Darby does not expressly mention the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, it cites to McCulloch for the proposition that 
[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of 
commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them 
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce.  
Id. at 118 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 421). 
 27. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 324. 
 28. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956–57 (2010). 
 29. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 272 (1993). 
 30. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997) (―When a ‗La[w] . . . for carrying 
into Execution‘ the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the 
various constitutional provisions we mentioned earlier . . . it is not a ―La[w] . . . proper for carrying 
into Execution the Commerce Clause. . . .‖) (internal citations omitted); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 166 (holding that the Commerce Clause, even when supplemented by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, does not permit Congress to control a state‘s regulation of its intrastate commerce); see 
also Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 183, 186 (2003) (detailing statements by Founders that the Necessary and Proper Clause was not 
intended to expand the scope of Congress‘s enumerated powers); Lawson & Granger, supra note 29, at 
272. 
 31. See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Conserving Habitats and Building Habitats: The 
Emerging Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land Use Development, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 
36 (1991) (discussing the emerging federalism tension in land use law). 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down a federal criminal law 
as infringing on state police powers); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (same). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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more.
33
 The word ―proper‖ in the Clause, then, demands that Congress 
respect those areas not allocated to them in Article I. In the context of 
regulation of commerce, the Court has held since Gibbons v. Ogden
34
 that 
the powers retained by the states include purely intrastate commerce: 
―[t]he enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that 
something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must 
be the exclusively internal commerce of a State.‖35 
Although the Court had previously hinted that it is possible for a 
Congressional act to be ―necessary‖ but not ―proper,‖36 Chief Justice 
Robert‘s opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius37 gave new force to this distinction 
and greatly expanded the ways in which legislation could fail to be 
―proper.‖ Although the disjointed nature of the NFIB opinions makes it 
unclear what in the case actually constitutes a holding and what is dicta,
38
 
five of the justices felt that Congress‘s mandate that all persons purchase 
health insurance was invalid under the commerce power, even as 
supplemented by the Necessary and Proper clause.
39
 The reason, they said, 
is that while the mandate may have been necessary, it was not proper. 
Roberts recognized that ―[i]t is of fundamental importance to consider 
whether essential attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the 
assertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.‖40 He 
added that ―Congress could reach beyond the natural limit of its authority 
and draw within its regulatory scope those who otherwise would be 
 
 
 33. Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of 
the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819, 826 (1999) 
(discussing state sovereignty in certain areas of commandeering, taxing, and regulating). 
 34. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 35. Id. at 195. 
 36. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-34 (1997). 
 37. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 38. Justice Ginsburg argues in her concurrence that it was unnecessary for the Court to reach a 
holding on the Commerce Clause issue because five members of the Court upheld the minimum 
coverage provision under the taxing power, and that the Commerce Clause holding was therefore not 
―outcome determinative.‖ Id. at 2629 n.12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Compare Ilya Somin, A Simple 
Solution to the Holding vs. Dictum Mess, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 2, 2012, 3:47 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/02/a-simple-solution-to-the-holding-vs-dictum-mess/ (arguing that 
the Commerce Clause section of Roberts‘s opinion is a holding and not dicta because the liberals 
joined with his statement that ―[t]he Court today holds that our Constitution protects us from federal 
regulation under the Commerce Clause so long as we abstain from the regulated activity.‖), with David 
Post, Dicta on the Commerce Clause, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 1, 2012, 6:40 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/01/dicta-on-the-commerce-clause/ (arguing that the quoted statement 
does not transform the Commerce Clause section of the opinion into a holding). 
 39. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (Roberts, C.J., opinion); Id. at 2646 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., 
Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting).  
 40. Id. at 2592 (Roberts, C.J., opinion) (quoting United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 
1967–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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outside of it.‖41 Justice Roberts cited Printz v. United States42 as an 
example of legislation that was improper because it violated the Tenth 
Amendment‘s concept of state sovereignty.43 Significantly, NFIB is the 
first case to explicitly strike down regulation under the Commerce Clause, 
even as supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
Together, these cases set forth a bright-line rule: congressional 
enactments pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause must be both 
―necessary‖ and ―proper.‖ But while that rule may be easy to articulate, it 
is difficult to apply. 
II. THE COURT‘S MODERN COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE INHERENTLY 
RELIES UPON THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 
A. Pre-Lopez Development of the Commerce Clause Doctrine was 
Expressly Tied to the Necessary and Propery Clause 
In his majority opinion in NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts quipped that 
―[t]he path of our Commerce Clause decisions has not always run 
smooth.‖44 This understatement puts a diplomatic gloss on nearly 200 
years of mixed signals in the Court‘s Commerce Clause jurisprudence. But 
on this twisting course from Gibbons v. Ogden
45
 in 1824 to the Court‘s 
most recent Commerce Clause decision in NFIB, the development of the 
doctrine has an unmistakable trend: expansion.
46
 In the time between the 
Court‘s assertion in Gibbons that Congress has ―limited authority to 
regulate commerce . . . between the different States‖47 and its admission in 
NFIB that ―it is now well established that Congress has broad authority 
 
 
 41. Id.  
 42. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 43. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592. 
 44. Id. at 2585. 
 45. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Gibbons was the first great expansion of the scope of 
Congress‘s power under the Commerce Clause, with the Court holding that ―[t]his power, like all 
others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.‖ Id. at 196. 
 46. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556–57 (1995) (discussing the expansion of 
the Commerce Clause to address issues that are increasingly national). Scholars at the beginning of the 
twentieth century recognized this trend before the modern Commerce Clause era increased the federal 
government‘s reach even further. See, e.g., Walter C. Noyes, Development of the Commerce Clause of 
the Constitution, 16 YALE L.J. 253, 258 (1907). 
 47. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 125. 
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under the Clause,‖48 Congress ―ushered in a new era of federal regulation 
under the commerce power.‖49 
Although the Court struggled to adopt a consistent test for the limits of 
the Commerce Clause in the first part of the twentieth century,
50
 Franklin 
Roosevelt‘s aggressive New Deal policies required a more centralized 
federal control and mandated a broader conception of the commerce 
power.
51
 Beginning with the Court‘s 1937 decision in NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp. that upheld federal regulation of purely intrastate 
manufacturing activities,
52
 the Court declined to strike down a single piece 
of federal legislation enacted under the Clause until its 1995 Lopez 
decision invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act.
53
 During this period, 
the Court developed two categories of regulation sustainable under the 
Commerce Clause that now underpin the ESA‘s regulation of intrastate, 
non-commercial species: (1) regulation of ―activity that substantially 
affects interstate commerce,‖54 and (2) regulation of intrastate activity that 
is ―an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which 
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated.‖55 In summarily reciting these categories without adequate 
regard for their evolution in the cases since 1937, the Lopez Court glossed 
over their textual hook: the Necessary and Proper Clause.
56
 The Court‘s 
decisions since the New Deal era often expressly invoked this clause as 
the justification for extending the reach of the Commerce Clause to certain 
intrastate activity.
57
  
 
 
 48. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585. 
 49. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554. 
 50. Although this Note cites cases preceding the modern Commerce Clause era, it does so only 
insofar as modern cases rely on them. The development of the Commerce Clause doctrine before 1937 
is beyond the scope of this Note. For a full discussion thereof, see generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 252–59 (4th ed. 2011). 
 51. See Fowler, supra note 13, at 70–71. 
 52. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937). 
 53. See Mank, supra note 21, at 384. 
 54. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. 
 55. Id. at 561. 
 56. See Case Comment, Substantial Effects Test—Controlled Substances Act, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
169, 176 (2005) (―[T]he textually justifiable limiting principle that the Court failed to find in Lopez [is 
that] the intrastate regulation must be ‗necessary‘ and ‗proper‘ to an exercise of the express power to 
regulate the channels of, instrumentalities of, or persons and things in interstate commerce.‖); see also 
J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 
616–19 (arguing that the intersection between the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause best explains the ―substantial effects‖ prong). 
 57. See Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance 
Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 589–94 (2010) (tracing the development 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause in Commerce Clause jurisprudence through a similar set of cases). 
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1. The “Effects” Prong of the Commerce Clause is anchored by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause 
In Jones & Laughlin, the Court upheld the authority of the National 
Labor Relations Board to regulate employer-employee relations and 
prevent unfair labor practices in the manufacturing industry—even when 
the employees and factories in question operated entirely within one 
state.
58
 By the time Jones & Laughlin was decided, it was already well 
established that Congress could regulate two categories of activities that 
essentially comprise interstate commerce: (1) the channels of interstate 
commerce
59
 and (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or 
persons or things in interstate commerce.
60
 These two categories were not 
contentious because they represented a categorical, formalistic conception 
of what interstate commerce is. Less clear, however, was the extent to 
which Congress could regulate activities or objects that are not themselves 
interstate commerce but merely affect it. The Court in Jones & Laughlin, 
declining to follow its previous ―current of commerce‖61 and ―direct and 
indirect effects‖62 tests, stated that the relevant inquiries are whether the 
regulated activities ―have such a close and substantial relation to interstate 
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that 
commerce from burdens and obstructions‖63 and ―[w]hether or not 
particular action does affect commerce in such a close and intimate 
fashion as to be subject to federal control.‖64  
In supporting the proposition that Congress‘s power may reach wholly 
intrastate activities, the Jones & Laughlin Court relied on precedent in 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States,
65
 Railroad 
Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. 
(Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co.),
66
 and the Shreveport Rate case.
67
 These cases 
 
 
 58. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937). 
 59. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917). 
 60. Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate), 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914). 
 61. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 399 (1905). 
 62. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 544–46 (1935); Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307 (1936). 
 63. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37. 
 64. Id. at 32. 
 65. 295 U.S. 495, 551 (invalidating federal regulations of poultry slaughterhouses as reaching 
into purely intrastate activity, even though the poultry had once been in the ―stream of commerce.‖). 
 66. 257 U.S. 563, 588 (1922) (upholding the federal fixing of rail carrier rates even on intrastate 
rails in order to stabilize the corresponding rate changes on interstate lines). 
 67. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate), 234 U.S. 342 (1914) 
(upholding the federal fixing of rail carrier rates even on intrastate rails in order to stabilize the 
corresponding rate changes on interstate lines). 
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all expressly or impliedly cite the Necessary and Proper Clause as the 
basis for this extension of the commerce power. The Schechter, opinion 
explained that when Congress seeks to regulate complex national 
commerce, the Necessary and Proper Clause affords it the ―necessary 
resources of flexibility and practicality.‖68 The Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. 
Court held that ―orders as to intrastate traffic are merely incidental to the 
regulation of interstate commerce and necessary to its efficiency.‖69 And 
in the Shreveport Rate case, the regulation of intrastate affairs was upheld 
because Congress ―possess[es] the power to foster and protect interstate 
commerce, and to take all measures necessary or appropriate to that 
end.‖70 The precedent cited in Jones & Laughlin, along with the Court‘s 
language on the subject in that case (―essential or appropriate‖),71 evinces 
the Court‘s recognition at the genesis of the modern ―effects‖ category that 
Congress‘s power in this regard is rooted in the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
As this line of cases developed, the Court continued to acknowledge 
the Necessary and Proper Clause as the textual anchor of the ―effects‖ 
prong. In United States v. Darby, the Court upheld the application of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (establishing a minimum wage and other 
working conditions standards) to employees who manufactured goods for 
sale in interstate commerce.
72
 The Court agreed that the employees were 
not themselves participating in interstate commerce, but nonetheless held 
that Congress could regulate their working conditions under the 
Commerce Clause.
73
 The opinion cites McCulloch—the seminal Necessary 
and Proper case—to support its assertion that Congress‘s power under the 
Commerce Clause ―extends to those activities intrastate which so affect 
interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to 
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a 
legitimate end . . . .‖74  
 
 
 68. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 530. 
 69. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 257 U.S. at 588 (emphasis added). Here, the Court‘s use of the 
term ―incidental‖ refers to the powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause—a characterization 
dating back to the Court‘s earliest Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence. See generally 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (repeatedly referring to Congress‘s authority 
under the Clause as ―incidental‖).  
 70. Shreveport Rate, 234 U.S. at 353. 
 71. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
 72. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 73. Id. at 125. 
 74. Id. at 118. 
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The next year, the Court applied the same logic in United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co.
75
 In affirming the validity of a federal statute 
setting minimum prices for milk as applied to milk sold only intrastate, the 
Court ruled that the regulation properly fit into the ―effects‖ category.76 
The Court again concluded that this effects analysis was appropriate 
because ―the national power to regulate the price of milk moving interstate 
. . . extends to such control over intrastate transactions . . . as is necessary 
and appropriate to make the regulation of the interstate commerce 
effective . . . .‖77 
The cases in the ―effects‖ line immediately following Wrightwood 
Dairy neglected to expressly reference the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
But by continuing to cite the cases just discussed when explaining the 
effects prong, these later opinions impliedly incorporated the reasoning of 
the earlier cases.
78
 Moreover, both Justice Hugo Black‘s concurrence in 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States and Justice O‘Connor‘s 
dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority discuss 
the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
79
 Whether expressly or 
impliedly, the Court‘s Commerce Clause jurisprudence in this regard 
consistently recognized that the expansion of the commerce power to 
intrastate activity relies on the Necessary and Proper Clause.
80
 
2. The Necessary and Proper Clause Underpins the Court’s “Larger 
Regulatory Scheme” Analysis 
While the effects prong received most of the Court‘s attention in its 
early 20th century Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the cases slowly 
developed an alternate articulation of Congress‘s power to regulate objects 
and activities falling outside the two traditional categories. Beginning with 
Jones & Laughlin, the Court gradually began to uphold regulation of 
activities that, though not affecting interstate commerce, were members of 
 
 
 75. 315 U.S. 110 (1942). 
 76. Id. at 121 (―It is the effect upon interstate commerce or upon the exercise of the power to 
regulate it . . . which is the criterion of Congressional power.‖). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123–24 (1942) (citing Shreveport Rate and 
Wrightwood Dairy Co.). 
 79. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 271–72 (1964) (Black, J., 
concurring); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 584–85 (1985) (O‘Connor, J., 
dissenting) (―It is through [the Necessary and Proper Clause] that an intrastate activity ‗affecting‘ 
interstate commerce can be reached through the commerce power.‖). 
 80. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1964) (citing the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and Wrightwood Dairy Co. in support of Congress‘s power to regulate intrastate activity 
under the commerce power). 
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a ―class of activities‖ affecting interstate commerce.81 This category 
eventually morphed into the post-Lopez doctrine as activity that is ―an 
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity . . . .‖82 This 
reasoning takes a slightly different tack than the effects analysis. Whereas 
the effects prong allows Congress to regulate intrastate activity bearing a 
close and substantial relationship to interstate commerce,
83
 the ―class of 
activities‖ test validates regulation of activities that concededly have no 
impact on interstate commerce on their own.
84
 Despite this, ―[w]here the 
class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal 
power, the courts have no power ‗to excise, as trivial, individual instances‘ 
of the class.‖85 
Though the Court often cites the 1942 case of Wickard v. Filburn
86
 as 
the birth of this test,
87
 its logic was employed as early as United States v. 
Darby.
88
 The Fair Labor Standards Act did more than establish a minimum 
wage and regulate working conditions in intrastate manufacturing plants; it 
also required employers to keep records of the number of hours worked by 
their employees.
89
 Though the keeping (or not) of these records would 
admittedly have no effect on interstate manufacturing, the Court held that 
Congress ―may require the employer, as a means of enforcing the valid 
law, to keep a record showing whether he has in fact complied with it.‖90 
This mirrors the Court‘s later reasoning that ―the regulatory scheme could 
be undercut unless the intrastate activity [is] regulated.‖91 
Just as in the effects prong, Congress‘s authority to reach purely 
intrastate activity under the ―class of activities‖ analysis cannot properly 
be understood as an exercise of its commerce power alone. The Darby 
court recognized the implicit role of the Necessary and Proper Clause in 
this extension of the commerce power when it wrote that ―[t]he 
requirement for records even of the intrastate transaction is an appropriate 
means to the legitimate end‖ of regulating interstate commerce.92 The 
 
 
 81. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152–54 (1971). 
 82. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
 83. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
 84. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005) (―Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity 
that is not itself ‗commercial,‘ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate 
that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.‖). 
 85. Perez, 402 U.S. at 154 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968)). 
 86. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 87. See, e.g., Perez, 402 U.S. at 151; Raich, 545 U.S. at 17. 
 88. 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941). 
 89. Id. at 111. 
 90. Id. at 125. 
 91. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
 92. Darby, 312 U.S. at 125. 
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Court noted further that the requirements were ―incidental‖ to Congress‘s 
power to regulate working conditions.
93
 As discussed above, the term 
―incidental‖ is a direct reference to McCulloch‘s foundational Necessary 
and Proper analysis.
94
 
The Court expanded and clarified this category of regulation in 
Wickard v. Filburn.
95
 The Court now considers this landmark case 
―perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority 
over interstate activity . . . .‖96 Congress, attempting to normalize and 
regulate the national market for wheat, enacted the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938.
97
 To combat oversupply problems, the act 
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to prescribe annual limits on the 
acreage of wheat that farmers were allowed to grow.
98
 Filburn was a 
farmer who brought an as-applied challenge to the regulation. He 
contended that his wheat production could not be regulated under the 
Commerce Clause because he grew it solely for personal consumption.
99
 
The Secretary took the position that, by growing wheat for consumption 
within his own home, Filburn was—however slightly—reducing the 
national demand for wheat.
100
 That effect, when taken together with all 
similar effects across the country, amounted to a substantial impact on the 
demand for wheat.
101
 In siding with the Secretary‘s position, the Court 
established the important ―similarly situated‖ aggregation principle.102 
That Filburn‘s ―own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial 
by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation 
where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others 
similarly situated, is far from trivial.‖103 By permitting Congress to 
consider the cumulative effect of all ―similarly situated‖104 regulated 
 
 
 93. Id. at 124–25. 
 94. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418 (1819); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 
257 U.S. 563, 588 (1922) (―[O]rders as to intrastate traffic are merely incidental to the regulation of 
interstate commerce and necessary to its efficiency.‖) (emphasis added); see also supra text 
accompanying note 69. 
 95. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 96. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2588 (2012) (quoting Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 560). 
 97. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 115 (1942). 
 98. Id. at 114–15. 
 99. Id. at 118. 
 100. Id. at 127. 
 101. Id. at 128. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 127–28. 
 104. Vexingly, the Court neglected to define how precisely articulated these ―similarly situated‖ 
activities must be. The effect the aggregated activities have on interstate commerce varies with how 
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activities in a comprehensive scheme, the Court allowed for regulation of 
the minutest intrastate activity. And by citing the same McCulloch 
language authorizing regulation constituting ―appropriate means to the 
attainment of a legitimate end,‖105 the Wickard court adopted the precedent 
cases‘ recognition of the Necessary and Proper Clause as the textual 
footing for this exercise of the Commerce Clause.
106
 
Following Wickard and throughout the pre-Lopez era, the Court 
continued to refine and expand the types of activities subject to federal 
regulation under the ―class of activities‖ framework. The Court in 
Maryland v. Wirtz reaffirmed that it could not ―excise, as trivial, 
individual instances falling within a rationally defined class of activities 
. . . .‖107 And the Court hammered the point home in Perez v. United 
States, approving of the Darby Court‘s holding that a class of 
activities can be ―properly regulated by Congress without proof that the 
particular intrastate activity against which a sanction was laid had an effect 
on commerce.‖108 The Court‘s justification for this reach, as always, was 
that such regulation was an ―appropriate means for the attainment of a 
legitimate end . . . .‖109 
The pre-Lopez lines of cases for both the effects prong and the ―class of 
activities‖ test demonstrated the Court‘s recognition that, when seeking to 
regulate activity beyond the channels and instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce and persons and things in interstate commerce, Congress must 
rely on more than its enumerated commerce power. Only in conjunction 
with the Necessary and Proper Clause can Congress validly reach 
intrastate, non-commercial activity.
110
 Though the Court‘s Commerce 
 
 
broadly those activities are defined. See John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi 
Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 194 (1998). 
 105. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124. 
 106. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418 (1819); see also supra text 
accompanying note 94.  
 107. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968). Here, the ―rationally defined‖ language is a 
reference to the Court‘s stance toward Congress‘s fact-finding duty. In this line of cases (and today), 
the Court has held that Congress‘s burden to show that a regulatory scheme will have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce is low. It must show only that there is a ―rational basis for finding a 
chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce.‖ Id. at 190 (quoting Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964)). 
 108. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152 (1971) (emphasis omitted). 
 109. Id. at 151. 
 110. See Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795, 807–08 
(1996) (―[T]he [New Deal] Court did not simply and directly enlarge the scope of the Commerce 
Clause itself, as is often believed. Rather, it upheld various federal enactments as necessary and proper 
means to achieve the legitimate objective of regulating interstate commerce. In other words, the Court 
acknowledged that the regulation of local activity affecting interstate commerce is not itself a 
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Clause cases after Lopez give only perfunctory notice to this principle, the 
bedrock laid by precedent continues to inform the doctrine. 
B. Telling Congress “No”: Lopez and Morrison Made a Stand for the 
Necessary and Proper Clause (Without Realizing it) 
1. United States v. Lopez: How the Court did the Right Thing the 
Wrong Way 
The landmark ruling in United States v. Lopez marked the end of the 
Court‘s hands-off approach to Congress‘s enactments under the 
Commerce Clause.
111
 In a 5–4 decision, the Court struck down the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act, invalidating Congressional exercise of the 
Commerce Clause for the first time since Carter Coal.
112
 The challenger 
argued that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to forbid 
―any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows 
. . . is a school zone.‖113 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 
agreed that ―[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense 
an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, 
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.‖114 To find otherwise, 
he wrote, the Court ―would have to pile inference upon inference . . . .‖115 
Distinguishing previous cases in which the Court had allowed Congress to 
consider the aggregate effect of otherwise trivial impacts on commerce 
(notably Wickard), the Court reasoned that those other regulated actions 
were fundamentally economic in nature.
116
 
 
 
regulation of interstate commerce; Congress‘s power over commerce is not confined to that granted by 
the Commerce Clause.‖) (footnote omitted).  
 111. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995). 
 112. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 301 (1936) (striking down federal regulation of 
purely intrastate coal manufacturing). 
 113. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (quoting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(q)(1)(A) (1988)). 
 114. Id. at 567. 
 115. Id. The chain of causal reasoning the Court rejected ran thus: ―[T]he presence of guns in 
schools poses a substantial threat to the educational process by threatening the learning environment. 
A handicapped educational process, in turn, will result in a less productive citizenry. That, in turn, 
would have an adverse effect on the Nation‘s economic well-being.‖ Id. at 564. 
 116. Id. at 561. The court distinguished Hodel v. Va. Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass‘n, Inc., 452 
U.S. 264 (1981) (concerning intrastate coal mining); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) 
(intrastate extortionate credit transactions); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (restaurants 
utilizing substantial interstate supplies); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964) (inns and hotels catering to interstate guests); and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, (1942) 
(production and consumption of homegrown wheat). 
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The Court noted two other defects in the statute: it provided no 
―jurisdictional element‖ attempting to limit the statute‘s application only 
to guns that were related to interstate commerce,
117
 and it contained no 
legislative findings as to the commercial impact of possessing a handgun 
in a school zone.
118
 The significance of these flaws followed logically 
from the Court‘s new position that trivial, intrastate activity cannot be 
aggregated to demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate commerce 
unless the activity is economic in nature; if the regulated activity is 
non-economic, the Court would not defer to Congress‘s rational-basis 
judgment that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce.
119
  
The new requirement that regulated activity be ―economic‖ was met 
with derision by the dissent and by commentators.
120
 The distinction 
between economic and non-economic activity was supported only by the 
Court‘s assertion that a ―pattern‖ of cases upheld federal regulation of 
activities that were economic in nature.
121
 Though it conceded that ―[t]hese 
examples are by no means exhaustive,‖122 and despite the fact that not a 
single exercise of the commerce power had been struck down since the 
development of its modern doctrine, the Court saw fit to derive from these 
cases the principle that ―[w]here economic activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be 
sustained.‖123 The Court‘s decision to distinguish between economic and 
non-economic activity, especially in light of its admission that ―a 
determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or 
noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty,‖124 was 
dubious. 
 
 
 117. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
 118. Id. at 562–63. 
 119. Id. (Noting that although ―Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to 
the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce,‖ they should do so when ―no such 
substantial effect [is] visible to the naked eye.‖) (citation omitted). 
 120. See id. at 627–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, 
Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 
TENN. L. REV. 605, 618–25 (2001); Peter M. Shane, Federalism’s “Old Deal”: What’s Right and 
Wrong with Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201, 220–22 (2000); Donald H. Zeigler, 
The New Activist Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1367, 1395–97 (1996). 
 121. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. One commentator writes that this principle relies on ―the coincidence of the adjudication 
of economic activity in previous cases.‖ Craig L. Jackson, The Limiting Principle Strategy and 
Challenges to the New Deal Commerce Clause, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 11, 17 (2012) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 124. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566. 
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Though the Court‘s choice lacks adequate justification in the opinion, it 
is defensible in the context of the textual anchor for Commerce Clause 
effects analysis: the Necessary and Proper Clause. Though the opinion 
does not mention the Clause, limiting Congress‘s control of trivial, 
intrastate activities to those that are economic and refusing to deferentially 
review Congress‘s basis for finding that possession of a gun affects 
interstate commerce can be understood as efforts to define the boundaries 
of what is necessary and proper.
125
 
Take the majority‘s complaint that the act contained no legislative 
findings as to the relationship between possession of a handgun in a school 
zone and interstate commerce.
126
 Although the Court‘s Commerce Clause 
cases had consistently deferred to such conclusory congressional 
statements dating back to the New Deal era, the Lopez Court faulted the 
challenged act for not being more explicit.
127
 The Court‘s statement that 
―no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye‖128 implicitly 
questioned whether Congress‘s prohibition of gun possession was 
―necessary‖ to the regulation of interstate commerce.129 
But the core of the Court‘s decision—refusing to aggregate non-
economic, intrastate activities to demonstrate a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce—rests on firmer ground than a judicially created, 
artificial distinction. By denying Congress the ability to preempt the 
states‘ traditional police power in a manner so attenuated to the regulation 
of interstate commerce, the Court was fundamentally respecting the 
requirement that federal regulation under the effects prong of the 
Commerce Clause be ―proper.‖130 The majority was concerned that 
upholding the Guns-Free School Zones Act ―would obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what is local‖131 and recognized 
―areas such as criminal law enforcement [and] education where States 
historically have been sovereign.‖132 These concerns echo Chief Justice 
 
 
 125. See Gardbaum, supra note 110, at 811 (―The majority held that the federal Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1990 failed the modern test of whether the regulated activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce without in any way acknowledging that this test states the circumstances under 
which the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes federal control of local activities as the means to a 
legitimate end.‖). 
 126. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. 
 127. Gardbaum, supra note 110, at 830–31. 
 128. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. 
 129. Gardbaum, supra note 110, at 830. 
 130. See id. at 831. See also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(positing that the Lopez Court ―implicitly acknowledged‖ the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
 131. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring)). 
 132. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. 
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Marshall‘s concern that legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
be both ―necessary‖ and ―proper‖.133 
2. United States v. Morrison: The Court Holds the Fort 
In United States v. Morrison,
134
 the Court was tasked with deciding 
how far its federalism concerns in Lopez would go toward invalidating 
federal regulation of criminal activity. The case concerned the 
constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act (―VAWA‖), which 
created a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence.
135
 
Congress learned from its mistake in Lopez and bolstered the VAWA with 
―numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated 
violence has on victims and their families‖ in an attempt to demonstrate 
the link between gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce.
136
 
Despite a valiant effort by Congress to show a causal relationship,
137
 the 
Court retorted that Congress‘s findings were ―substantially weakened by 
the fact that they rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that we have 
already rejected as unworkable if we are to maintain the Constitution‘s 
enumeration of powers.‖138 The Court, sticking to its reasoning in Lopez, 
held that validating such a tenuous connection between the regulated 
activity and interstate commerce would ―completely obliterate the 
Constitution‘s distinction between national and local authority . . . . ‖139  
The Court also reaffirmed the Lopez Court‘s concern for what 
constitutes proper regulation of activity that is not itself interstate 
commerce. The Court feared expanding the Commerce Clause to 
traditional areas of sovereign state authority, such as family law.
140
 
Morrison doubled down on the Court‘s recognition in Lopez of the 
requirement that federal regulation of activity outside interstate commerce 
be proper.  
 
 
 133. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 366–67 (1819) (―It is not ‗necessary or 
proper,‘ but ‗necessary and proper.‘ The means used must have both these qualities.‖). 
 134. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 135. Id. at 601. 
 136. Id. at 614.  
 137. The act claimed that interstate commerce would be affected ―by deterring potential victims 
from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting 
with business, and in places involved in interstate commerce . . . by diminishing national productivity, 
increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate 
products.‖ Id. at 615 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103–711, at 385 (1994)).  
 138. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 615–16. 
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C. Gonzales v. Raich: A Return to Inconsistency 
Despite these detours from Commerce Clause deference, the Court in 
Gonzales v. Raich upheld the Controlled Substances Act‘s prohibition on 
the growth of marijuana as applied to instances where the marijuana was 
grown for purely intrastate consumption.
141
 Holding that the Lopez and 
Morrison decisions had not significantly changed the Court‘s Commerce 
Clause doctrine, the majority reaffirmed NLRB‘s holding that regulation of 
intrastate activity is permissible so long as it prevents a valid, national 
scheme from being undercut.
142
 
Significant to the purpose of this Note, Justice Scalia wrote a 
concurring opinion that clearly delineated the third prong of the Lopez 
rule.
143
 He explained that, because the Constitution grants Congress the 
power to regulate commerce, the Court‘s validation of activities that 
merely ―substantially affect[]‖ interstate commerce fundamentally rely on 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.
144
 Congress is not actually regulating 
commerce—it is regulating things that affect commerce. This is 
acceptable, according to Scalia, but only because this regulation is often 
necessary to effectuate Congress‘s granted commerce power. Thus, rather 
than relying on an ever-shifting understanding of whether challenged 
legislation substantially affects interstate commerce, courts should look to 
whether the legislation is an ―appropriate means of achieving [a] 
legitimate end . . . .‖145  
 
 
 141. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 142. Id. at 24–25. 
 143. Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 144. Id. at 33–34. 
 145. Id. at 40. For scholarly responses to Scalia‘s framework, see David M. Crowell, Gonzales v. 
Raich and the Development of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: Is the Necessary and Proper Clause 
the Perfect Drug?, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 251 (2006). See also Case Comment, Substantial Effects Test—
Controlled Substances Act, 119 HARV. L. REV. 169, 174 (2005) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause is the best justification for the application of the commerce power to intrastate activity) (―Had 
the Court squarely addressed the problem, it could have abandoned the Lopez economic framework 
altogether and reattached the ‗substantial effects‘ doctrine to its only justifiable textual anchor: the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. Under such an approach, the courts would more closely scrutinize the 
necessity of federal regulation the more it encroaches into traditional state areas, denying federal 
power in spheres of local economic activity with only attenuated links to interstate regulation.‖); 
Randy Barnett, Understanding Justice Scalia’s Concurring Opinion in Raich, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 9, 2012, 4:13 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/03/09/understanding-justice-
scalias-concurring-opinion-in-raich/ (arguing that use of the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
supplement the Commerce Clause is just as restrictive as it is expansive). 
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Indeed, as Scalia explained, defining this category of regulation as 
activities that ―affect‖ interstate commerce is ―incomplete,‖ because:  
[T]he authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the 
regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws governing 
intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 
Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce 
effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that 
do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.
146
  
The ―effects‖ label, therefore, is both over and under inclusive.  
Examining the Court‘s Commerce Clause jurisprudence from 1937 to 
the present, it is clear that the Necessary and Proper Clause is the textual 
underpinning of any federal regulation under the commerce power that 
reaches purely intrastate and non-commercial activities. Though the Court 
does not always expressly acknowledge this principle, the precedent has 
remained consistent with Justice Scalia‘s argument: if Congress is not 
regulating something in interstate commerce, then it cannot be relying 
solely on the Commerce Clause. 
III. THE ESA‘S REGULATION OF PURELY INTRASTATE, NON-COMMERCIAL 
SPECIES IS AN IMPROPER EXERCISE OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER 
CLAUSE 
When the Court handed down its Lopez decision in 1995, the legal 
community began questioning what other federal regulatory schemes 
could be subjected to Commerce Clause scrutiny, including the ESA.
147
 
Although the Court warned in Katzenbach that it would not conduct a 
searching review of Congress‘s intent in creating regulatory schemes 
under its commerce power, the Lopez majority‘s focus on the distinction 
between economic and non-economic activity (a focus echoed in 
Morrison) cast uncertainty on ―statute[s] that by [their] terms [have] 
nothing to do with ‗commerce‘ or any sort of economic enterprise, 
however broadly one might define those terms.‖148 The ESA, which had 
appeared to be on solid constitutional footing since its enactment in 1973, 
 
 
 146. Raich, 545 U.S. at 34–35 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 147. See, e.g., Dral & Phillips, supra note 120, at 618–25; Bradford C. Mank, Protecting 
Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State 
Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 735–36 (2002); 
Nagle, supra note 104 and accompanying text; Eric Brignac, The Commerce Clause Justification of 
Federal Endangered Species Protection: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 79 N.C. L. REV. 873, 883 (2001). 
 148. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
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suddenly seemed to fall into the same impermissible category as the Gun-
Free School Zones and Violence Against Women Acts. Just as the Lopez 
opinion criticized Congress for failing to state its legislative findings as to 
the nexus between gun violence and interstate commerce, the ESA‘s text 
makes no attempt to rationally relate its regulation of endangered species 
to commerce of any kind. 
Raich, with its affirmation of the ―comprehensive regulatory scheme‖ 
notion from Jones & Laughlin, provided seemingly independent grounds 
for validating the application of the commerce power to intrastate, non-
commercial species. Indeed, the two circuit court cases that addressed this 
issue after Raich relied primarily on that case in rejecting Commerce 
Clause challenges: San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. 
Salazar
149
 and Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne.
150
 In 
particular, the courts relied on this statement from Raich: ―[w]here the 
class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal 
power, the courts have no power ‗to excise, as trivial, individual instances‘ 
of the class.‖151 
A. When Faced with a Commerce Clause Challenge, the Court’s Decision 
Turns in Part on Whether the Regulation is “Proper” 
Up to this point, federal courts of appeals have upheld the application 
of the ESA to species that are purely intrastate and have no commercial 
value. Ordinarily, this activity would be beyond Congress‘s reach under 
the Commerce Clause. The courts have given two justifications for 
extending the commerce power to regulation of these species: (1) the 
taking of intrastate, non-commercial species substantially impacts 
interstate commerce, as per the third prong of the Lopez test, or (2) under a 
Raich analysis, regulation of these species is permitted as a necessary 
component of a concededly valid, nationwide regulatory scheme—the 
ESA.  
But the mechanical way in which the lower courts have employed these 
two avenues to uphold regulation of purely intrastate, non-commercial 
species vividly illustrates the weakness of the Supreme Court‘s approach 
to the Commerce Clause since Lopez. In 1995, at the start of the so-called 
―Federalism Revolution,‖152 the Court made clear that it intended to draw 
 
 
 149. 638 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 150. 477 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 151. Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). 
 152. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7 (2001). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
190 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:169 
 
 
 
 
a line in the sand: Congress‘s power to regulate under the Commerce 
Clause ―is subject to outer limits.‖153 Unfortunately, the Court awkwardly 
attempted to reconcile this ultimatum with sixty years of case law in which 
Congress‘s authority under the Clause seemed boundless.154 Because it 
declined to overturn a single case from that era, the Court was forced to 
construct a non-textual test by which it could plausibly flunk the Gun Free 
School Zones Act. This necessity gave rise to the Court‘s much-maligned 
economic/non-economic distinction.
155
 Rather than recognize that 
Congress‘s exercise of the commerce power felt intuitively wrong because 
regulating gun possession in school zones is not a ―proper‖ means of 
regulating interstate commerce, the Court cabined its rationale in the 
Commerce Clause alone.  
Since then, the Court has shown a willingness to create new tests and 
distinctions on a whim when it feels Congress has overstepped the bounds 
of propriety in its Commerce Clause regulation. NFIB v. Sebelius
156
 is 
notable in this regard. NFIB required the Court to resolve whether 
Congress‘s enactment of an individual mandate on all persons to purchase 
health insurance under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(―PPACA‖)157 was a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause.  The 
PPACA requires health insurance companies to, among other things, 
guarantee coverage for individuals regardless of their preexisting medical 
conditions.
158
 Knowing that this requirement would greatly increase the 
risk to insurers and may drive them from the market, Congress enacted the 
―individual mandate.‖159 The mandate requires all individuals, with limited 
exceptions, to purchase health insurance.
160
 Because many healthy 
individuals would be required to purchase health insurance, the insurers 
could effectively subsidize the cost of insuring individuals with 
preexisting conditions.
161
 
The Secretary characterized the individual mandate as a proper exercise 
of the Commerce Clause because, under the effects prong, ―the failure to 
 
 
 153. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.  
 154. Mathews, supra note 21, at 947 (―[Lopez and Morrison] upended fifty years of conventional 
wisdom about the limits on Congress‘s power under the Commerce Clause—namely, that there were 
effectively none—and left lower courts with an uncertain new framework to apply.‖) (footnote 
omitted). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 157. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2010). 
 158. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2645. 
 159. Id. at 2645. 
 160. Id. at 2580. 
 161. Id. at 2645. 
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purchase insurance has a substantial and deleterious effect on interstate 
commerce . . . .‖162 Given the expansive list of commercial activities the 
Court has allowed Congress to regulate, the Secretary‘s assertion that the 
national market for health insurance belongs on that list seems perfectly 
reasonable.. Because Congress was now requiring health insurers to insure 
all individuals regardless of their level of risk, the failure of healthy 
individuals to offset that burden would certainly affect the interstate 
market in health insurance; insurers would be driven out of the market. 
Even the Court‘s new test in Lopez was easily satisfied—the regulated 
activity (the purchase of health insurance) is a fundamentally economic 
activity. 
But Chief Justice Roberts was not swayed by this argument. He wrote 
that ―the power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of 
commercial activity to be regulated,‖163 and ―the individual mandate . . . 
does not regulate existing commercial activity.‖164 Rather, it ―compels 
individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the 
ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce.‖165 Roberts 
believed this authority would go too far, because ―[a]llowing Congress to 
justify federal regulation by pointing to the effect of inaction on commerce 
would bring countless decisions an individual could potentially make 
within the scope of federal regulation, and—under the Government‘s 
theory—empower Congress to make those decisions for him.‖166 
As Justice Ginsburg noted in her concurrence, Roberts‘s ―limitation of 
the commerce power to the regulation of those actively engaged in 
commerce finds no home in the text of the Constitution or our 
decisions.‖167 Indeed, like Chief Justice Rehnquist‘s artificial distinction 
between economic and non-economic activity in Lopez, Roberts located 
his intuitive conviction that Congress overreached in a new doctrinal test. 
Worse, it is not entirely clear that the individual mandate flunks that test. 
As Justice Ginsburg argues, the supposed ―inaction‖ of failing to buy 
health insurance ―can be seen as actively selecting another form of 
insurance: self-insurance.‖168 The argument that inaction on one front 
amounts to action on another left Roberts able only to grumble that ―the 
distinction between doing something and doing nothing would not have 
 
 
 162. Id. at 2585 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 163. Id. at 2586. 
 164. Id. at 2587. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 2621 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 168. Id. at 2622 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
192 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:169 
 
 
 
 
been lost on the Framers, who were practical statesmen, not metaphysical 
philosophers.‖169 
Roberts‘s attempt to check this apparent congressional overreach thus 
left him grasping at tenuous semantic distinctions. But that was not his 
only option. Roberts‘s concern, obviously, was not that Congress had 
crossed some critical line between the regulation of action and inaction. 
His concern was for the protection of federalism. He quoted Bond v. 
United States for the proposition that ―[b]y denying any one government 
complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism 
protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.‖170 The 
mandate risked an erosion of federalism and an invalid intrusion on 
individual liberty. But Roberts‘s failure to acknowledge the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as the backbone of the effects prong required him to create 
the action/inaction distinction to achieve the necessary result. 
Interestingly, Roberts did separately address the government‘s argument 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause independently validates the 
individual mandate.
171
 In that analysis, he delineated the function of the 
term ―proper‖ in the Clause and solidified the lesson from Printz and New 
York v. United States that the term acts as an independent limit.
172
 That 
line of reasoning, employed correctly in the Commerce Clause analysis, 
would have avoided the creation of the dubious activity/inactivity test. 
Unlike Scalia‘s Raich concurrence, Roberts performed a thorough 
analysis of why the Necessary and Proper Clause, though used as a tool in 
Raich, can also be a limitation.
173
 A law that is not ―consistent with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution‖ is not a ―proper means for carrying 
into [e]xecution Congress‘s enumerated powers.‖174 Roberts was vague as 
to what exactly constitutes an improper act that is not consistent with the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution. Notably, though, he cited Justice 
Kennedy‘s concurrence in Comstock175 for the proposition that 
consideration of whether a law is ―proper‖ includes ―whether essential 
attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal
 
 
 169. Id. at 2589 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 170. Id. at 2578 (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011)). 
 171. Id. at 2591–93. 
 172. Id. at 2592. 
 173. See Barnett, supra note 145 (arguing that Scalia‘s invocation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause carried with it the inherent limits that adhere to the term ―proper‖).  
 174. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 175. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
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power under the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . .‖176 Whatever the Court 
may mean by ―proper,‖ that requirement includes at least due 
consideration of whether the federal government is impermissibly 
encroaching on traditional areas of state authority. Further, and relevant to 
both the ESA cases and Raich, Roberts opined that an act fails the 
―proper‖ analysis if it ―reach[es] beyond the natural limit of its authority 
and draw[s] within its regulatory scope those who otherwise would be 
outside of it.‖177 
Of course, arriving at this conclusion is only the beginning of the 
analysis. The more difficult question—the one that various factions of the 
Court have tussled over for years—is where and how to draw the line of 
propriety. The next section explores this challenge through the prism of 
the ESA‘s regulation of non-commercial, intrastate protected species. 
B. Though the ESA’s Regulation of Intrastate, Non-Commercial Species 
May Mechanically Satisfy the Court’s Current Commerce Clause 
Doctrine, Such Regulation is not “Proper” 
As explained above, the lower courts have upheld federal regulation of 
intrastate, non-commercial species in essentially two ways: by framing 
either the species themselves or the activities involved with ―taking‖ the 
species as having a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
178
 or by 
upholding specific listings of the species as members of a ―class of 
activities‖ affecting interstate commerce.179 
Both of these justifications inherently and implicitly call upon the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. Neither the taking of these species nor the 
species themselves are an activity or object in interstate commerce: the 
species are entirely contained within the state, and they often have no 
commercial value.
180
 Therefore, regulating the taking of these species 
cannot be understood only as an exercise of the commerce power. Whether 
through the substantial effects prong or the larger regulatory scheme 
 
 
 176. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (quoting Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967–68 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 
1114 (2005); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
1218 (2004); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001). 
 179. Two cases have used this reasoning since it was employed in Raich: San Luis Water Auth. v. 
Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 498 (2011), and Alabama-Tombigbee 
Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1097 (2008). 
 180. Fowler, supra note 13, at 76–77 (―For the most part, federal protection of listed species 
cannot be said to concern commerce.‖). 
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framework, regulation of this activity is valid only insofar as it is 
necessary and proper to effectuate Congress‘s actual power: the power to 
regulate interstate commerce. 
Once in this framework, the limitations imposed on the Necessary and 
Proper Clause in the NFIB holding come into play. Congress can no longer 
regulate at will without regard to the external restraints of the Tenth 
Amendment, as it admittedly could if acting directly within its commerce 
power. Instead, the considerations of federalism and state sovereignty 
enter the calculus.  
The difficulty comes in the Court‘s patchwork approach to elucidating 
the meaning of ―proper.‖ Any reference to the Tenth Amendment will 
necessarily be tautological: Congress cannot do anything it is not 
expressly empowered to do.
181
 As the Court explained in U.S. v. Darby, 
―[t]he amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not 
been surrendered.‖182 The cases bear out the inconsistency this kind of 
line-drawing creates. Why, for example, is the regulation of non-
commercial, intrastate marijuana valid, but regulation of a gun in a school 
zone is not? These questions go to the heart of the Court‘s longstanding 
federalism debate, and there are no easy answers. The best that can be 
done is to parse the Court‘s decisions on the issue and delineate a fair 
guideline for what is proper and what is not. 
A good place to start is all the way back at McCulloch, in which Chief 
Justice Marshall authored the seminal conception of federal regulation 
under the Commerce Clause: ―Let the end be legitimate, let it be within 
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which 
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with 
the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.‖183 This 
language, while helpful guidance, can lead to circular problems: if the 
federal government is regulating within its sphere of authority, any 
regulation is valid—but how should the moving target that is the 
commerce power be defined? Further, Marshall mentions that the ―end‖ 
must be legitimate. But in Hammer v. Dagenhart,
184
 the Court seemed to 
dispel that notion. The Court stated that, regardless of Congress‘s true 
purpose in enacting legislation, it is valid if it can be seen as the regulation 
 
 
 181. U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
 182. Id. 
 183. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
 184. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
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of interstate commerce (though the Court ultimately struck down that 
particular statute).
185
 
The same issue seems to apply to the ESA. The text of the legislation 
makes no attempt to rationally relate the protection of endangered species 
to the regulation of interstate commerce.
186
 But doesn‘t Hammer v. 
Dagenhart suggest that no such attempt is required? No. Hammer stands 
in part for the proposition that Congress‘s ends are proper if Congress is 
actually regulating interstate commerce.
187
 In that case, the regulation in 
question clearly fell within the second category of the modern Commerce 
Clause doctrine: it regulated the sale in interstate commerce of products 
manufactured by child laborers.
188
 In the ESA cases at hand, by contrast, 
Congress is operating within the third prong, and the regulation relies on 
the Necessary and Proper Clause to reach activity that is not actually 
related to interstate commerce. If the regulation in question could find its 
home in the Commerce Clause alone, any analysis of its true purpose 
would be inappropriate. But the ESA‘s reliance on the Necessary and 
Proper Clause when it regulates species that are in no way involved in 
interstate commerce subjects it to an analysis of its means and its ends. 
This analysis should proceed by culling the lessons from each of the 
Court‘s discussions of what is ―proper‖ and attempting to define general 
guidelines. As luck would have it, the rules of thumb employed by the 
Court in its misguided attempt to set boundaries on the commerce power 
can be reframed to determine how the Court views the ―proper‖ 
requirement. Recall that the decisions in Lopez, Morrison, and NFIB can 
be viewed as statements by the Court that the congressional regulation in 
question was improper. Rather than framing the issue in these terms, the 
Justices set forth the ―economic/non-economic‖ and ―activity/inactivity‖ 
categories by reviewing the Court‘s Commerce Clause cases and 
determining that they were consistent with these distinctions.
189
 But 
though these distinctions are inapt for restraining Congress‘s authority 
 
 
 185. Id. at 276 (―We have neither authority nor disposition to question the motives of Congress in 
enacting this legislation. The purposes intended must be attained consistently with constitutional 
limitations and not by an invasion of the powers of the States.‖). In Hammer, Congress hadtried to 
crack down on the abuse of child labor by prohibiting the sale in interstate commerce of products 
produced by child labor. Id. at 268. Its stated purpose was moral, not commercial. Id. at 271–72. The 
Court struck down the regulation as an invalid exercise of the commerce power. Id. at 276–77. 
 186. Fowler, supra note 13, at 69. 
 187. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 148–51.  
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under the Commerce Clause itself,
190
 they provide reasonable bases for 
determining what congressional action is proper or not.  
Take the economic/non-economic distinction. As Justice Scalia noted 
in Raich, this categorization is, for Commerce Clause purposes, both over- 
and under-inclusive.
191
 Many activities or objects that have no economic 
nature will properly be reached by the Necessary and Proper Clause, and 
many activities that are economic will not be reached by the Commerce 
Clause alone. But as a yardstick for whether federal regulation is proper, 
the economic requirement is an adequate rule of thumb. Randy Beck, a 
preeminent Necessary and Proper Clause scholar, explained it like this:  
Given the close relationship between intrastate and interstate 
economic activity, a statute regulating local economic conduct will 
usually be calculated to accomplish an end legitimately 
encompassed within the plenary congressional authority over 
interstate commerce. Likewise, the causal relationship linking 
economic means with economic ends will generally be plain or 
obvious. Thus, limiting Congress to the regulation of local 
economic activity ensures that such regulations will, in most 
circumstances, be plainly adapted and really calculated to achieve 
some legitimate end connected with the interstate economy.
192
 
In Lopez, then, the Court‘s fundamental holding was that Congress‘s true 
purpose—protecting schoolchildren from gun violence—lacked a ―plain or 
obvious‖ link between economic means and economic ends. Indeed, the 
Court refused to ―pile inference upon inference‖ to establish the requisite 
economic nexus.
193
 The requirement that the regulated activity be 
economic acted as the Court‘s proxy for an articulable limit on Congress‘s 
commerce power as aided by the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Likewise, the court offered a rule of thumb in Morrison that makes 
more sense when connected to the Necessary and Proper Clause than to 
the Commerce Clause. In that case, the Court considered the validity of 
the Violence Against Women Act (providing federal civil remedies for 
domestic violence victims).
194
 Just as in Lopez, the Court found that no 
sufficient nexus existed between domestic violence and interstate 
 
 
 190. See supra text accompanying notes 148–51. 
 191. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 235 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also supra text 
accompanying notes 143–46.  
 192. Beck, supra note 56, at 625 (footnote omitted). 
 193. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
 194. See supra text accompanying notes 134–40.  
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commerce.
195
 Although the government argued that the Court should 
aggregate the impact of all domestic violence in order to determine its 
effect on interstate commerce, the Court declined to do so.
196
 The Court 
announced the rule that ―Congress may [not] regulate noneconomic, 
violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct‘s aggregate effect on 
interstate commerce.‖197 This rule, limiting the aggregating principle 
employed by the Court in Wickard, is best viewed as a limitation on the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, rather than the Commerce Clause. Although 
Congress made a ―mountain‖ of findings regarding the effects that 
domestic violence has on interstate commerce,
198
 the Court simply 
couldn‘t stomach such a far-reaching exercise of federal power. It worried 
that such authority would destroy the ―distinction between what is truly 
national and what is truly local‖—the epitome of federalism.199 If the 
federal government could aggregate any discrete activity to demonstrate 
an effect on interstate commerce and thus bring that activity under its 
control, there would be nothing left for the states to govern. Finding no 
recourse in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence to prevent this destruction 
of federalism, the Court was once again forced to construct a judicial rule 
to cabin federal power. But because the regulation of domestic violence 
cannot be understood as a regulation of interstate commerce, the rule is in 
reality a guiding principle for what is ―proper‖ when the Necessary and 
Proper Clause supplements the Commerce Clause. 
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts‘s creation in NFIB of the 
activity/inactivity distinction was at its core an attempt to check federal 
power over individual liberty when no Commerce Clause doctrine seemed 
to provide a limit. The individual mandate required all individuals to 
purchase health insurance, regardless of their perceived need for it.
200
 
Roberts worried that ―[a]llowing Congress to justify federal regulation by 
pointing to the effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless 
decisions an individual could potentially make within the scope of federal 
regulation, and—under the Government‘s theory—empower Congress to 
make those decisions for him.‖201 But a simple application of the Court‘s 
Commerce Clause doctrine seems to have allowed that result. Only by 
 
 
 195. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). 
 196. Id. at 613. 
 197. Id. at 617. 
 198. Id. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 199. Id. at 617–18 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995)). 
 200. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). 
 201. Id. at 2587. 
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crafting the activity/inactivity distinction could Roberts assuage the 
federalism concerns underlying the mandate.  
Each of these judicial checks on what is ―proper‖ regulation under the 
Commerce Clause acts to invalidate certain applications of the ESA to 
intrastate, non-commercial species. The first question in the analysis is 
whether federal regulation of such species can be viewed as a regulation of 
commerce itself: the channels, persons, things, or instrumentalities of 
commerce (prongs one and two). Courts in every case have had no 
difficulty determining that it cannot be so framed.
202
 Because the ESA as 
applied to these species is not directly regulating commerce, then, it relies 
on the Necessary and Proper Clause as expressed in the third prong of the 
Court‘s Commerce Clause doctrine. Accordingly, such regulation must be 
proper. In many of the cases decided by the lower courts, this standard has 
not been met. 
Take the delta smelt, the species at issue in San Luis Water Auth. v. 
Salazar.
203
 Federal regulation of this species has had wide-ranging impacts 
in key areas of traditional state sovereignty.
204
 The biological opinion 
issued by the FWS at issue in San Luis regulated the water levels in the 
San Joaquin valley.
205
 The low levels prescribed by the opinion have 
devastated local farming, destroyed thousands of jobs, and created a 
massive food shortage in California.
206
 Food supply, water reclamation, 
and the local economy are all areas that have traditionally been left to the 
states to govern. By inhibiting the ability of the states to solve the 
problems this national regulation is creating, application of the ESA to the 
delta smelt risks eroding the line between what is national and what is 
local—the fundamental premise of a sound federal system. 
But by mechanically applying the ―effects‖ and ―class of activities‖ 
prongs of the Commerce Clause to this question, the lower court failed to 
check this erosion of federalism. The court would have been better served 
to assess whether federal regulation of an interstate, non-commercial 
species is truly ―proper‖ based on the guidelines provided by the Court in 
Lopez, Morrison, and NFIB. Each of those guidelines cuts against a 
finding of propriety.  
 
 
 202. See, e.g., San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1174 (9th Cir. 
2011) (―By all accounts, the category most applicable here is the third—the ‗substantial effects‘ 
category.‖). 
 203. Id. at 1167. 
 204. Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 
913 (2008). 
 205. California’s Man-Made Drought, supra note 1. 
 206. Id.  
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The delta smelt, like the possession of a gun or an act of domestic 
violence, is concededly not economic in nature. The San Luis court 
admitted that ―the delta smelt presently has no commercial value.‖207 Nor 
is the regulation itself—prescribing maximum water levels—an inherently 
economic activity or regulation. Lopez‘s teaching that regulation of 
non-economic objects and activities is improper suggests that this 
application of the ESA is suspect. The Ninth Circuit, though, moored its 
holding on the Raich principle: ―[t]hat a regulation ensnares some purely 
intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, 
we refuse to excise individual components of that larger scheme.‖208 The 
court‘s reliance on the ―larger regulatory scheme‖ category is deficient, 
however, because the regulation in question flunks the economic/non-
economic distinction where the statute in Raich did not. Though the 
homegrown medical marijuana at issue in Raich was ―not intended for . . . 
the stream of commerce,‖209 the Court saw fit to capture it in the 
regulatory sweep of the Controlled Substances Act because it was ―a 
fungible commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, 
interstate market.‖210 It refused to excise incidental intrastate activity, not 
incidental non-economic activity. The delta smelt, conversely, is not a 
commodity. Nor is there a market—interstate or otherwise—for its sale.211 
It is not ―economic‖ in any sense of the word.  
Imposing a requirement that the regulated object or activity be 
economic allows for a principled distinction between the proper regulation 
in Raich and the improper regulation in Salazar. Congress‘s larger 
regulatory scheme in Raich clearly had the goal of upending the market for 
illegal drugs, but the Controlled Substances Act was found constitutional 
under the Commerce Clause because it ―regulated‖ that interstate, 
commercial market. Any marijuana that was manufactured, no matter its 
intended purpose, was a potential commodity in that market. Its inarguable 
economic nature thus subjected it to federal regulation. But federal 
regulation of species under the ESA is putatively constitutional to the 
extent that Congress is regulating objects or activities that affect interstate 
commerce. There is no enumerated power of species preservation. 
Accordingly, to extend Congress‘s reach under the ESA to intrastate 
 
 
 207. Salazar, 638 F.3d at 1167. 
 208. Id. at 1175 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005)). 
 209. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (internal citation omitted).  
 210. Id. at 18.  
 211. Salazar, 638 F.3d at 1167.  
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species like the delta smelt that have no commercial value is to permit 
improper means for the attainment of an extra-constitutional end. 
But the court in Salazar went on to argue that the aggregate of all 
protected species under the ESA effects interstate commerce.
212
 This move 
is barred by Morrison‘s principle that no analysis of whether certain 
regulation is ―proper‖ can resort to the aggregation of non-economic 
objects.
213
 The facts here further illustrate the impropriety of doing so. 
Indiscriminately lumping together the delta smelt with every other 
protected species to claim an economic impact would pave the way to 
federal regulation of nearly anything. The Court in Morrison was rightly 
concerned that application of this reasoning could ―be applied equally as 
well to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the 
aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national 
economy is undoubtedly significant.‖214 
Finally, NFIB‘s activity/inactivity distinction shows in part why this 
regulation is improper: the delta smelt are not engaged in any commercial 
activity. The Ninth Circuit speculatively argued that ―[e]ven where the 
species . . . has no current commercial value, Congress may regulate under 
its Commerce Clause authority to prevent the destruction of biodiversity 
and thereby protect the current future interstate commerce that relies on 
it.‖215 By requiring California to reduce its water levels, the FWS has 
called the State into action on behalf of a commercially inactive species of 
fish. The Ninth Circuit‘s justification of this requirement—that doing so 
could create a market in the distant future that could then be appropriately 
regulated by Congress—is strikingly similar to the individual mandate‘s 
creation of previously non-existent commercial activity for the purpose of 
regulating it. ―The power to regulate commerce,‖ wrote Roberts, 
―presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated.‖216 This 
application of the ESA to non-commercial species, like the individual 
mandate, ―vests Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the 
necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power . . . [and] draw 
within its regulatory scope those who otherwise would be outside of it.‖217  
 
 
 212. Id. at 1175 (―Pursuant to Raich, when a statute is challenged under the Commerce Clause, 
courts must evaluate the aggregate effect of the statute (rather than an isolated application) in 
determining whether the statute relates to ‗commerce or any sort of economic enterprise.‘‖). 
 213. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). 
 214. Id. at 615–16. 
 215. Salazar, 638 F.3d at 1176 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 216. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2572, 2586 (2012). 
 217. Id. at 2592. 
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CONCLUSION 
In crafting its Commerce Clause jurisprudence over the past century, 
the Supreme Court has articulated a workable test for what activities fall 
within the scope of Congress‘s power. But, like any other language handed 
down by the Court, the ―effects‖ and ―class of activities‖ tests cannot be 
understood in a vacuum. Part of the blame lies with the Court for its 
undisciplined muddying of the nexus between the Commerce Clause and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Rather than expressly embracing the 
Necessary and Proper Clause as the textual underpinning of part of its 
Commerce Clause doctrine, the Court‘s recent decisions have attempted to 
reconcile seemingly incongruent opinions. These judicial gymnastics have 
obscured doctrine that was relatively clear at its genesis.  
Further, the lower courts have worsened the issue by mechanically 
applying these tests in a manner divorced from the values underpinning 
them. The ESA‘s regulation of species that exist entirely within the 
confines of one state and that have no commercial or economic value 
represents the furthest possible federal reach into the province of state 
authority. If the Constitution‘s promise of powers retained by the States is 
to have any meaning, this is one place where courts must draw a line in the 
sand. 
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